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ABSTRACT 
Organizations can suffer attacks designed to take advantage of employee vulnerabilities.  
Successful attacks cause firms to suffer financial damage ranging from minor information 
breaches to severe financial losses.  Cybercriminals focus on organization executives, because 
the power and influence they wield affords access to more sensitive data and financial resources.  
The purpose of this research in progress submission is to identify the types of executive 
behaviors that information security professionals believe introduce risk to an organization, as 
well as to explore the degree of risk organizations face as a result of these behaviors. 
Keywords: Information Security; Executive behavior; Organizational risk; 
Cybersecurity; SNS usage 
MOTIVATION 
Cybercriminals direct social engineering (SE) attacks at organizational employees as a 
means to secure access to sensitive data (Conteh and Royer 2016; Gardner and Thomas 2014; 
Greitzer et al. 2014; Wilcox et al. 2014).  For example, cybercriminals use pretexting, a form of 
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SE, to create scenarios that convince victims to perform a desired action (Brody et al. 2012; 
Greitzer et al. 2014; Luo et al. 2011).  Examples of successful pretexting attacks include the theft 
of employee W2 data, or loss of hard dollars (Honan 2015; Rivera 2018).  Pretexting can be 
embedded in many vectors of attack, including phishing (Conteh and Royer 2016; Symantec 
2015; Verizon Enterprises 2016), spear phishing (He 2012; Heartfield and Loukas 2015; Laszka 
et al. 2015; Teplinsky 2013), vishing via telephone, voice over IP (VoIP), or short message 
service (SMS) messages (Gardner and Thomas 2014; Shahriar et al. 2015). Such breaches put 
organizations at risk in three primary areas:  monetary losses, corporate liability, and credibility 
(Cavusoglu et al. 2004).   
Constantiou and Kalinikos (2015) observed that data gathered from social network sites 
(SNS) could be used to design SE attacks.  SNS users share personal information for various 
reasons, such as developing or maintaining personal relationships or general knowledge 
acquisition (Krasnova et al. 2017; Wakefield and Wakefield 2016), as well as perceived benefits 
to job performance (Ali-Hassan et al. 2015). Such data, collected from employees’ personal 
social media presence, such as community-based platforms (Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn), 
discussion boards, blogs, wikis, and the like (Greitzer et al. 2014; He 2012; Kim 2012), help 
cybercriminals to design authentic pretexting scenarios. 
Consider Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks, which focus on compromising or 
spoofing the email accounts of organization executives (Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017; 
Honan 2015; Korolov 2015). This form of pretexting is often referred to as an email account 
compromise (EAC) attack, and are a component of the overall BEC attack chain (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation 2017).  Organization executives are frequent targets of EACs because of their 
access to sensitive data, as well as their ability to command actions from subordinates (Bullée et 
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al. 2017; Federal Bureau of Investigation 2017; Sharp 2017; Trustwave 2017). With an EAC 
attack, the cybercriminals can use social media data to hijack or spoof executives’ accounts and 
convince employees to initiate an electronic funds transfer (EFT) or wire transfer to a bank 
account that they control, primarily located in China and Hong Kong (Burch et al. 2015; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation 2017; Kemp 2016).    
Addressing risks organizations face from executive social media use has been lightly 
explored in the information security literature.  Research has touched on the impact of executive 
behavior impact on financial reporting risks, project management risks, (Davidson et al. 2015; 
Liu and Wang 2016), information leakage about the organization itself (Molok et al. 2013), and 
damage to organizations and their customers (Cain 2011).  Additionally, while existing literature 
has explored steps organizations can take to minimize the potential damage from social 
engineering attacks in general (Rocha Flores and Ekstedt 2016; Vaast and Kaganer 2013), to 
understand the legalities surrounding organizational policies regarding employees use of their 
personal social media channels in non-work related situations (Sánchez Abril et al. 2012), and 
examined organizational issues associated with surveillance of personal SNS (Uldam 2016), 
scant literature sheds light on the financial risks executives social media use. 
Research objective  
 While an extensive literature examines individual drivers of SNS use (boyd and Ellison 
2007), scant research examines how the SNS use of executives create risks for their employing 
organization in ways that SNS use by regular rank-and-file employees do not.  For example, 
executives disclosing their location in a SNS post may pose a financial risk to an organization, as 
it may offer insight into strategic maneuvers by firm leadership.   To explore executive 
behaviors, we propose asking information security professionals how executives SNS use pose 
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risks, particularly financial risks, to an organization.  An associated goal of this research study is 
to explore the degree to which these behaviors pose additional forms of risk to an organization.  
Hence, we investigate: What executive SNS behaviors pose financial risks to an organization? 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information Security definition 
The term information security, while frequently used, lacks a seminal definition or 
explanation.  Existing literature observed the term is a concept that lacks a clear-cut definition 
(Anderson 2003; Torres et al. 2006).  Dlamini et al. (2009) found that the concept of information 
security predates the invention of the computer. Interestingly, there are numerous articles 
(Crossler et al. 2013; Johnston et al. 2015; Lowry et al. 2015; Rocha Flores and Ekstedt 2016) 
which use the term information security without ever supplying a definition, thus leaving it to the 
reader to interpret its meaning through their own personal lenses and experiences.   
Further complicating the issue of defining information security is the increasing use of 
the terms cybersecurity or cyber security.  These terms may be viewed by some as having the 
same meaning, thus making their usage interchangeable (Agresti 2010; von Solms and van 
Niekerk 2013). von Solms and van Niekerk (2013) explored the differences between the terms 
information security and cyber security/cybersecurity, concluded there is a difference between 
the terms, and argued they should not be used interchangeably.  This study will use the Torres et 
al. (2006, p. 532) definition of information security as “…a well-informed sense of assurance 
that information risks and technical, formal and informal controls are in dynamic balance”. 
Organization executives 
 Existing literature has explored organization executives through multiple lenses.  As early 
as Hambrick (1981), literature explored the impact that executives had on the success of their 
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organization.  The seminal work of Hambrick and Mason (1984), which offered the Upper 
Echelons perspective model, served as a foundation for exploring the various ways in which 
organizational outcomes can be anticipated.  According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
organizational outcomes should be viewed as reflections of top managers and their values.   
Hambrick and Mason (1984) also argued that the behavior and characteristics of executives 
mattered as it related to organizational outcomes.  Hambrick and Mason (1984) theorized that 
top managers made strategic choices that would impact the performance of the organization.  
According to Hambrick and Mason (1984), the success or failure of these choices could be 
partially predicted based on observable criteria such as age, functional tracks, prior career 
experiences, education level, socioeconomic background, financial position, and group 
characteristics. 
Building on Hambrick and Mason (1984), Hambrick et al. (2005) argued that senior 
executives are of specific interest because they serve as an interface between the organization 
and its environment, and wield sufficient power to impact the organization.  According to 
Hambrick et al. (2005), executive level work is qualitatively different than work found at other 
levels of the organization.  Hambrick et al. (2005) also found that executive leadership behaviors 
could impact both the vitality and performance of their organization, and thus warranted further 
examination. 
Organization executives are of special interest to adversaries, because of the level of 
access and oversight they have.  Krombholz et al. (2015) outlined whaling attacks, a type of 
phishing attack, which specifically targets organization executives.  Adversaries can use whaling 
attacks to achieve different goals.  For example, Hong (2012) described whaling attacks targeting 
chief operating officers (CEOs) with fake subpoenas as email attachments, which had malware 
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installed.  In 2016, a finance executive at Mattel was the victim of a whaling attack, resulting in a 
$3 million EFT that was recovered before it could be collected by the adversaries (Associated 
Press 2016). 
Organizational information disclosure 
A review of existing literature regarding organizational information disclosure revealed 
the presence of multiple themes in the space.  Conger et al. (2013) explored the challenges 
organizations face in protecting corporate data.  Among their findings in this area, Conger et al. 
(2013) noted that data collection and sharing among organizations, combined with the growing 
number of ways that customer data can be collected, pose a significant challenge to organizations 
in their efforts to protect data collected.  Hsu et al. (2015) studied the effectiveness of extra-role 
behaviors exhibited by organization workers as they relate to information security policy 
effectiveness.  Defined as employee behaviors which extend beyond those described in 
organization security policies, Hsu et al. (2015) found that when combined with in-role 
behaviors, extra-role behaviors have a positive impact on organizational security policy 
effectiveness.  Lowry and Moody (2015) proposed a new model which examined employee 
motivations, in an attempt to determine employee intent to comply with new organization 
security policies.  This model, which combined control theory with reactance theory, found that 
organizational controls were a positive predictor of an employee’s intent to comply with new 
security policy, while perceived threats to personal freedom resulted in employee reactance to 
new security policy.  Lowry et al. (2015) explored ways in which organizations could leverage 
fairness theory and reactive theory to increase the likelihood that employees would adhere to 
organization security policies.  Among their findings, Lowry et al. (2015) discovered that 
employees were more likely to adhere to organization security policies if an atmosphere of 
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organization trust existed.  Lowry et al. (2015) found that one method to increase the level of 
organization trust was through the implementation of explanation adequacy, in which employees 
were informed as to the underlying reason for the existence of, and the importance of, 
organization security policy.  Lee et al. (2016) examined the impact of mandatory standards on 
the effectiveness of organizational information security.  Among their findings, Lee et al. (2016) 
reported that implementation of a higher security standard does not necessarily lead to an 
increase in security for an organization.  
Existing literature has also explored the marketplace consequences organizations can face 
after suffering a data breach.  Wang et al. (2013) examined the impact organizations may face 
when publicly disclosing a data breach event.  Wang et al. (2013) found no significant difference 
in marketplace reaction when an organization disclosed a data breach in financial reporting 
documents, but that the marketplace did respond differently when a breach was announced 
outside the release of financial reporting documents.  
METHOD 
Grounded theory methods were first proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967).  Grounded 
theory methods can be applied to both qualitative and quantitative research data (Charmaz 1995).  
Grounded theory emphasizes theory development, and allows researchers to aim at various levels 
of theory when conducting research (Denzin and Lincoln 1994).  Use of grounded theory 
methods allows the researcher to discover concepts which are grounded in collected data, as well 
as determining their underlying sources (Corbin and Strauss 1990).  Glaser and Strauss (1967) 
argued that grounded theory methods could be used to develop new theory by focusing on the 
differences between daily realities of behaviors, and how those behaviors are interpreted by those 
who engage in those behaviors (Suddaby 2006).  Because there is little understanding of the 
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degree of financial risk posed to an organization by way of executive behaviors and SNS usage, 
use of grounded theory methods will provide an avenue to determining the answer to the 
research question for the proposed study.    
The proposed study of financial risks associated with executive use of SNS will be a two-
phase, mixed methods study.  Data will need to be collected about the specific behaviors that 
executives can engage in via SNS usage, which may result in financial risks to an organization.  
Once this data is collected and analyzed, the behaviors will then be grouped into constructs for 
the purpose of collecting further data about the degree to which these behaviors may pose a 
financial risk to an organization.  The figure below illustrates the proposed structure of the study 
to be performed. 
 
 Figure 1.  Proposed study structure 
 
 This study will advance current research by gaining a deeper understanding of 
how executive behaviors on SNS impact risk to the organization.  This deeper understanding will 
come about as a result of collecting examples of senior executive behaviors from information 
security professionals, which they believe pose risk to an organization.  These behaviors will 
then be grouped into constructs, which will then be rated by information security professionals in 
terms of degree of risk to an organization. 
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